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Abstract: The Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) was adopted in April 2014, and it has been uniformly regulating the issues of insider dealing
and market manipulation throughout the EU since 3 July 2016. Unlike the previous legislation, deviation from the regulation’s wording will
not be possible. This should exclude different applications, which have occurred in the individual EU Member States so far, when
investigating unlawful behaviours marked as market abuse. The regulation introduced several substantial changes.
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1. Introduction
Market abuse is considered to be one of the most dangerous unlawful behaviours on the financial market although it is
usually referred to as victimless crime. The root of this is favouring certain group of investors with access to non-public
information (insiders) or dissemination of false and misleading information within the investing public. Accordingly, we
distinguish two basic forms of market abuse: insider dealing and market manipulation. The European Commission
assessed the existing regulatory framework for market abuse under the Market Abuse Directive1 and related
implementing directives as insufficiently effective.2 After ten years of existence and application of the given directive, a
new legislation was adopted in the form of regulation on market abuse.3 Its wording also takes account of the related
new legislation on provision of investment services and technological developments on the financial market.4 Parallel to
this legislation a new directive (MAD II) was adopted, harmonizing criminal penalties in the area of market abuse.
Criminal law measures can be considered an element to ensure the effective enforcement of EU policies, as recognized by
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.5
The purpose of the regulation (MAR) is to minimize the national differences in investigation of insider dealing and
respective sanction regimes. The regulation entered into force on 3 July 2016, and from this date it repealed MAD and
related implementing directives (including the regulation establishing exemptions for buy-back programmes and
stabilization of financial instruments). The adoption of the regulation will ensure unification of this issue as well as direct
effect of its provisions, and adoption of a national legislation, which may vary across countries, will not be required.
The purpose of the article is to analyze the fundamental changes introduced by MAR compared to the previous
European legislation. Several institutes were adopted from the market abuse directive and related implementing directives
in the respective regulation, whereas its wording includes also experience from practice or case law of the European Court
of Justice.
2. Substantive Changes Included in MAR
The regulation contains several changes,6 some of them are of only legislative and technical nature, and others assume
significant impact on more efficient investigation of unlawful conduct such as insider dealing and manipulative practices
on the capital market (market manipulation). In the following paragraphs we will try to analyze and summarize the most
important changes through some comments. We believe that identification of the most important changes is beneficial
not only for the theoreticians of the financial market, but also for the legal practice of the supervisory authority of the
capital market.
1. The regulation formally distinguishes, unlike MAD, three types of unlawful conduct as an administrative offence in
the field of market abuse: a) insider dealing, b) unlawful disclosure of inside information, c) market manipulation.7
Unlawful disclosure of inside information was subordinated to actions under letter a) in MAD.
2. The material scope as well as the personal scope of prohibition related to market abuse was extended, namely by
alternative trading platforms and their participants. The MAD was applied only to financial instruments admitted to
trading on a regulated market, or for which a request for admission on such market and its derivatives has been made.
On the contrary, the regulation includes also financial instruments traded on multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) which
were admitted to trading on MTFs or for which a request for admission to trading on MTFs has been made, and
financial instruments which are traded on organised trading facilities (OTFs8) and their derivatives9. The reason is the
increase in trading volume also on the given alternative trading platforms. In this connection, the personal scope was
extended by issuers of such financial instruments with regard to the obligations arising from the market abuse regulation.
3. The personal scope covers also those persons who act in collaboration to commit market abuse.10 In practice it
most commonly refers to brokers who devise a trading strategy designed to result in market abuse or persons who
encourage a person with inside information to disclose that information unlawfully, or persons who develop software in
collaboration with an investment firm for the purpose of facilitating certain forms of market abuse.
4. According to the regulation, the concept of financial instrument will include also emission allowances or auction
products based thereon traded on an auction platform with status as a regulated market. The emission allowances were
included into the financial instruments already by the adoption of previous Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID).11 From practical experience, a behaviour which has effect on benchmarks, subject to fulfillment of conditions
set out, is also understood as market manipulation according to the regulation.12
5. In addition to the existing administrative offences defined in the Market Abuse Directive (e. g. transaction, order or
other conduct related to the financial instrument; a commissive conduct)13, the regulation covers also omissions and
measures to prevent specific transactions (omissive conduct).14
6. A rebuttable presumption – so called interpretive rule to assess unlawful conduct 15 – has been formally established
which was already formulated by the decision-making practice of the European Court of Justice in the context of the
previous directive.16 It refers to objectivization of the conduct, which means that it is assumed that the conduct of a legal
or natural person who is in possession of inside information is forbidden from using inside information, thus an unlawful
conduct. However, a rebuttable presumption fully respects the preservation of the rights of defense. The respective
recital17 extends the interpretive rule also to all subsequent changes to orders that were placed before possession of inside
information, including the cancellation or amendment of an order, or an attempt to cancel or amend an order. In
practice it will mean that within the sanction proceedings the commitment of the offence of insider dealing will be
always presumed until proven otherwise by the person against whom the sanction proceedings are conducted (reversed
burden of proof).
7. When committing market manipulation, an attempt to engage in market manipulation18, which was originally
covered under the MAD only in relation to the second form of market abuse (insider dealing) shall be also deemed
unlawful.
Changes pursuant to item 5, 6 and 7 present a significant and a stricter legislation, extensively defining market abuse.
Based on this, it will be possible to sanction an unlawful conduct, the assessment of which was disputed or could not be
at all considered as one of the forms of market abuse in the past.
8. Insider dealing in the form of tipping (recommendation, abetting to trading based on a ‘good tip’ for investment)
will be examined in the context of subjective elements – the knowledge that it is an inside information and the conduct is
based thereon. Recommendation and abetting will be considered separately as an unlawful conduct, under the definition
of unlawful disclosure of inside information.
9. General exceptions to conducts that are otherwise deemed market abuse were directly reflected in the regulation
(buy-back programmes and price stabilization, etc.).19 Moreover, the regulation extended the activities and entities
which will not fall under the regulation due to public interest:
– transactions carried out by the European Commission or any other officially designated body acting on its behalf in
pursuit of public debt management policy;
– transactions carried out by the European Commission, special purpose vehicle of one or several Member States,
European Investment Bank, European Financial Stability Facility, European Stability Mechanism, an international
financial institution established by two or more Member States which has the purpose to mobilize funding and provide
financial assistance to the benefit of its members (especially the Single Resolution Board managing the supranational
Single Resolution Fund)20;
– activity of the Member States, European Commission or any other officially designated body acting on their behalf,
which concerns emission allowances and which is undertaken in pursuit of the climate policy or in pursuit of the
common agricultural or fisheries policy21.
The general exceptions do not apply to employees or external collaborators of the aforementioned entities (e. g.
employee of the Agency for Debt and Liquidity Management) under the conditions that the given natural persons carry
out prohibited transactions, directly or indirectly, on their own account, or they engage in prohibited behaviour in form
of aiding and abetting. However, national legislations should, in our opinion, implement such organizational measures
that would restrict market abuse by the said natural persons.
In addition to the original special exceptions to unlawful conducts (e. g. legitimate conduct of market makers, persons
authorised to act as counterparties, persons authorised to execute orders on behalf of third parties, takeover bids, etc.),
the regulation distinguishes some new special exceptions (behaviour on the basis of own trading plans and strategies,
market soundings22 if the relevant market lacks confidence). Some of the existing special exceptions are directly adopted
in the text of the regulation23, not only in the recitals as in MAD.
10. The Market Abuse Directive did not set forth the obligation of a legal entity to implement organisational measures
to restrict dissemination of inside information. The implementation thereof deprives the legal entity that is in possession
of inside information of the mentioned rebuttable presumption that it used the inside information. The regulation,
directly in its text, requires the implementation of the aforementioned measures.
11. For market manipulation the merits of dissemination of false information is complemented by dissemination of
misleading information or provision of false inputs in relation to a benchmark, or any other behaviour which
manipulates the calculation of a benchmark.24
The regulation’s non-exhaustive list of examples of manipulative behaviour includes placing orders, cancellation or
modification thereof by any and all available means of trading. Specifically this is an algorithmic and high-frequency
trading if it is executed with certain negative effect on the market.25 The algorithmic and high-frequency trading is
considered as one of the potential risk carriers, including manipulative practices. The requirement of its regulation refers
to the requirement of MiFID II for risk control at investment firms which use this method of trading.26 However, the
regulation also underlines the importance of various internet applications and their impact on the investor’s behaviour
(blogs, social networks like facebook) and points out the necessity of putting them on an equal footing with traditional
dissemination of information. The non-exhaustive list of market manipulation indicators was transferred from Directive
2003/124/EC implementing MAD to Annex I of the regulation. MAR, however, emphasises that it is only a non-
exhaustive list of indicators relating to false or misleading signals and to price positioning (Part A, Annex I) and a non-
exhaustive list of indicators relating to the employment of a fictitious device or any other form of deception or
contrivance (Part B, Annex I).
12. In addition to the national supervisory authorities, also a supranational supervisory authority, namely the
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), is involved in the process of accepted market practices (AMPs).
The national supervisory authority, which is the Národná banka Slovenska (National Bank of Slovakia) in the Slovak
Republic, will have to before establishing an accepted market practice notify ESMA of the intention to establish an
accepted market practice at least three months before the AMP is intended to take effect. Following this notification,
ESMA shall issue an opinion assessing the compatibility of the AMP with the criteria under the regulation, and whether
the establishment of the respective AMP would not threaten the market confidence. Where a national supervisory
authority establishes an accepted market practice contrary to the opinion of ESMA, it shall publish on its website a
notice setting out its reasons for doing so. Such procedure should facilitate market transparency and functioning of small
capital markets to which the relevant market practice should not necessarily present a threat as in the case of more
developed capital markets. At the same time, it will help avoid arbitrariness of procedures of national authorities
according to the principle ‘comply and explain’.
13. The regulation assumes establishment of effective precautionary measures, systems and procedures aimed at
preventing and detecting insider dealing, market manipulation and attempts thereof under the threat of administrative
sanctions for operators of regulated or non-regulated markets (MTF, OTF). These are requirements for the operators of
these markets not for market participants.27 In practice, it will more probably refer to technical software requirements
and requirements to carry out orders related to transactions. The details should be laid down in the implementing
technical standards of ESMA.
14. A number of changes were made within the obligation of disclosure of inside information (ad hoc publicity). One
of them is ad hoc publicity of inside information related to financial instruments that are admitted to trading on an SME
growth market (‘small and medium enterprises’). The respective inside information may be posted on the website of the
respective market instead of on the issuer’s website where such facility, based on the decision of the market operator, is
provided to SME issuers.28 By the effect of embedding this simplified way of information reporting, the administrative
burden for the issuers on the markets of small and medium enterprises should be reduced. In order to preserve the
stability of the financial system29, the regulation introduced a special reason for delaying the performance of the ad hoc
publicity obligation for selected issuers. Specifically, it refers to financial institutions and credit institutions where inside
information is related to their temporary liquidity problems (for example, the need to receive temporary financial
assistance from a central bank as lender of last resort). The delay may be executed with a time limit provided that the
following conditions are met cumulatively:30
– the disclosure of the inside information entails a risk of undermining the financial stability of the issuer and of the
financial system;
– it is in the public interest to delay the disclosure;
– the confidentiality of that information can be ensured;
– the competent authority has consented to the delay.
Provided that consent to delay the disclosure is not granted by the competent authority, the issuer must disclose the
information without delay. The introduction of the special reason is closely related to the second pillar of the EU’s
Banking Union (crisis management and resolution).31
15. The regulation introduces exemption from the obligation to draw up an insider list for issuers of financial
instruments admitted on the SME market. This is an unburdening approach in order to reduce the administrative costs
arising from this obligation for SMEs.32 We see this initiative as a psychological effect not to discourage starting small-
and medium-sized issuers with various administrative obligations which are connected with issuance and subsequent
trading in financial instruments. However, the supervisory authority may request for provision of an insider list.
Therefore, small- and medium-sized issuers will have to be able to develop an insider list upon request and provide it.
Moreover, the obligation to instruct persons with access to inside information remained for all the issuers. With respect
to the archiving obligation of the issuers, the period to retain all inside information on their websites has been prolonged
(from one year to at least five years).
16. The notification of managers’ transactions (transactions of persons discharging managerial responsibilities at the
issuer and transactions of persons closely associated with them) has been significantly extended. The obligation of
notification refers not only to transactions relating to shares admitted to a regulated market or their derivatives, but also
to transactions relating to debt instruments and/or all financial instruments to which the regulation subject will apply (it
means also emission allowances, financial instruments on OTF and MTF). At the same time, the regulation shortened
the notification period for the managers’ transactions, i. e. from five days to three days. The obligation of notification of
managers’ transactions was complemented by pledging and lending of financial instruments as the given legal operations
can result in a material and potentially destabilizing impact on the issuer.33 The regulation rationalized the
aforementioned addition of pledging and lending as follows, ‘without disclosure, the market would not know that there
was the increased possibility of, for example, a significant future change in share ownership, an increase in the supply of
shares to the marketplace or a loss of voting rights in that company’.34
17. The previous European legislation under MAD did not set forth any specific rules for cooperation between the
relevant national supervisory authorities and ESMA. Therefore, the regulation explicitly constituted the mutual relations
between the aforementioned authorities in the form of cooperation (in exchange of information, investigation of market
abuse forms, on-site inspection, and recovery of imposed pecuniary sanctions).35 In terms of the regulation, ESMA is in
the position of a coordinator of investigation in cases with cross-border effects if it is requested by one of the involved
national supervisory authorities. The cooperation in the form of investigation and on-site inspection may be executed in
several ways:
– the requested national authority may carry-out the on-site inspection or investigation itself;
– it may allow the requesting party to participate in an on-site inspection or investigation;
– allow the requesting party to carry out the on-site inspection or investigation itself;
– appoint auditors or experts to carry out the on-site inspection or investigation;
– share specific tasks related to supervisory activities with the other competent authorities.36
Supervisory authorities of third countries (non-EU countries) may also take part in cooperation provided that
cooperation arrangements concerning the exchange of information and the enforcement of obligations arising under
MAR are concluded with them.
18. Specifically it is necessary to draw attention to the specific legislation of whistleblowing for reporting of market
abuse behaviours.37 In this respect, the regulation puts greater emphasis on the protection of persons reporting
infringements of the provisions concerning prohibitions and obligations. Reporting should be carried out within a
reporting mechanism to a national supervisory authority.38 At the same time, according to the regulation, member states
should be allowed to provide for financial incentives for whistleblowers.
3. Conclusion
Most of the MAR provisions came into force on 3 July 2016 (some provisions have been applied since 2 July 2014;
provisions related to OTF, SME markets, emission allowances will apply only from 4 January 2017). In compliance with
the principle of direct applicability of the European regulation, the national supervisory authorities throughout the entire
European Economic Area must, therefore, adopt the relevant provisions of the regulation starting from the mentioned
date. The relevant national provisions governing the whole issue of market abuse (insider dealing and market
manipulation) were repealed in the Slovak Republic by amending the Act on Securities and Investment Services effective
from 1 July 2016.39 In compliance with Article 144, Paragraph 3 of the Act on Securities and Investment Services, the
sanctions for market abuse shall be imposed directly in terms of the regulation.40 With respect to the scope and
significance of changes introduced by MAR, it appears to be optimal that the national legislation was omitted and not
replaced. Adoption of own national legal provisions into the Act on Securities and Investment Services would bring a risk
that its wording could be in contradiction with the wording of the regulation. Despite the effort of the legislator, it can
be stated that not all areas of the MAR legislation were fully implemented. The regulation related to whistleblowing in
relation to market abuse has not been amended in details on national level despite the fact that the implementing
directive to the regulation41 that should harmonize the legal regulations in this area determined 3 July 2016 as the date
of its transposition. Although the Slovak Republic has a general legislation on reporting of anti-social behaviour (under
the Whistleblowing Act) since 1 January 2015, it has chosen an approach of special legislation for whistleblowing in
relation to all unlawful behaviours on the entire financial market, not only in relation to market abuse. This approach
was reflected in a bill amending the financial market supervision act – a basic procedural regulation for the entire
financial market. The reason is the effort to exclude differences in the application practice in relation to various financial
market entities. Although, we consider that the aforementioned approach is appropriate, but its legislative process has
been significantly falling behind as the transposition of the implementing directive should have taken place already on 3
July 2016 (only in relation to reporting of market abuse). The duration of the legislative process is in this case to the
detriment of effective reporting of suspicious transactions of insider dealing or market manipulation. With respect to the
fact that these are hardly detectable and provable unlawful conducts, the absence of a detailed whistleblowing process can
be deemed negative which makes it impossible to effectively enforce the provisions of the regulation despite the fact that
the Slovak Republic had repealed the national legislation in time due to conflict. At the same time, most of the changes
introduced by MAR and listed in the text above will not be applicable in the Slovak Republic given the small volume of
the Slovak capital market.
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